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I. Introduction
All great philosophers have understood that the education of
youth is the primary function of society-the means by which
humanity's inheritance is transmitted from one generation to
another.
Sadly, American public schools are in serious trouble in their
primary function of educating today's youth. The results of
numerous studies emphasize this point. The 1991 National
Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) study is especially
shocking: 72 percent of fourth-graders can do only third-grade
math; only 14 percent of eighth-graders can do seventh-grade math;
and only 5 percent of high school seniors demonstrated sufficient
grasp of geometry and algebra to be prepared for college mathe-
matics.2 More recently, a 1998 report by Education Week showed
that only forty percent of the fourth and eighth graders in urban
schools had scored at a basic level in reading, math, and science on
tests conducted by the NAEP.3 In addition, the performance of
seventeen-year-old African-American and Hispanic students is
equal to that of thirteen-year-old whites in every subject.4
Furthermore, American education appears to lag far behind that of
other highly developed nations.5 Indeed, it appears as though the
educational system that American children are being subjected to
1. This quotation is attributed to Admiral H.G. Rickover. Best known as a pioneer
of naval and civil nuclear power, the Admiral also became deeply interested in improving
America's public schools. In 1983, the year after his retirement from the Navy after sixty-
four years of service, Admiral Rickover established a nonprofit organization, the Center for
Excellence in Education, to put some of his ideas into practice. See Center for Excellence
in Education (visited January 10, 1999) <http://rsi.cee.org>.
2. See WILLIAM J. BENNEIT, THE DE-VALUING OF AMERICA 66 (1992). Dr. Bennett,
the former Secretary of Education under President Reagan, is an authority on American
education and a major proponent of education reform through a variety of measures,
including school choice. See id.
3. See Education Week, Quality Counts '98: The Urban Challenge (visited January 8,
1998) <www.edweek.org/sreports/qc98/>.
4. See Diane Ravitch, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, POLICY BRIEF No. 23, Student
Performance Today, (September 1997).
5. See Mary Frase, Pursuing Excellence: A Study of U.S. Fourth-Grade Mathematics and
Science Achievement in International Context (visited June 27, 1997) <http://www.ed.gov-
/NCES/timss> (Initial Findings from the Third International Mathematics and Science Study).
While fourth graders excel in math and science when compared to students in other nations,
eighth graders barely meet the international average. See id. By the twelfth grade,
American students lag far behind other nations; in fact, American twelfth grade students
rank nineteenth out of twenty-one industrialized nations in mathematics and sixteenth out
of twenty-one countries in science. See id.
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will not prepare them to secure the American dream and compete
in the global economy in the 21st century.
With such a debilitating problem, one would think that
educators and legislators would be clamoring for change.6
However, this could not be further from the reality of the current
situation.7  Recent attempts to implement education reform
measures have failed in the United States Congress,8 and state-
based reforms have met similar fates.9 While some near-sighted
"experts" argue for pouring more money into the dying system,a"
reformers are crying out for school choice.
6. In his 1997 State of the Union address, President Bill Clinton declared that "[E]very
state should give parents the power to choose the right public school for their children.
Their right to choose will foster competition and innovation that can make public schools
better." President's State of the Union Address, 33 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOc. 136 (Feb.
4, 1997). President Clinton went on to assert that charter schools, in addition to public
school choice, would be helpful in creating a better educational system. See id. However,
he did not refer to nonpublic school choice. See id.
7. Although the President did not address the subject in his 1997 State of the Union
speech, he did address nonpublic school choice the following year when he vetoed the
District of Columbia Student Opportunity Scholarship Act of 1997. See S. 1502, 105th Cong.
(1997) (vetoed May 20, 1998). The bill would have given parents the same kind of choice
that the President appeared to support in his 1997 State of the Union address. See id. Noted
journalist George Will, commenting on this veto of nonpublic school choice, said
[T]here are many more picturesque political sins than President Clinton's veto of
a modest school choice program last May. However, few political sins are as
purely, as simply contemptible as his killing of that bill, which would have enabled
2,000 children-a tiny portion of the District of Columbia's public school
students-to escape those life-blighting schools.
George F. Will, A Choice For Children, WASHINGTON POST, November 29, 1998, at C7.
United States Representative Joe Scarborough, a member of the House Education and the
Workforce Committee and the Speaker's Task Force on Education Reform, added that "[I]f
these liberals were so interested in helping students in inner cities, then why would they
continue to fight choice when the majority of people in inner cities want to be able to choose
what schools their children go to?" 144 CONG. REC. H8045 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1998)
(statement of Rep. Scarborough).
8. See, e.g., S. 1502. The "District of Columbia Student Opportunity Scholarship Act
of 1997," introduced by United States Senator Dan Coats, provided scholarships to attend
public or private schools in the District or nearby suburbs, or to pay the costs of
supplementary academic programs for D.C. resident students in low-income families. See id.
The bill was vetoed by the President on May 20, 1998. See id.
9. See, e.g., the Pennsylvania school choice proposal, which was not voted on at the end
of the Pennsylvania General Assembly's 1997-98 session. See Jeanette Krebs, New Voucher
Plan Emerges, But Time Is Short, HARRISBURG PATRIOT-NEWS, November 18, 1998, at Al.
The legislative session ended before support for the proposed legislation could be organized.
See id.
10. This contention by opponents of school choice will be discussed in detail in Section
V. of this Comment.
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 104:1
Specifically, reformers wish to implement nonpublic school
choice, a system that allows parents to choose the school that their
child will attend. This choice would allow the parents to have
greater control of the educational opportunities available to their
child." Even the "education establishment," which opposes
school choice,12 exercises choice by sending their own children to
nonpublic schools. 3 Such a decision by those actually involved in
the public school system should serve as a guide to all parents.
14
Indeed, school choice would allow parents, regardless of their
income, to choose the best educational environment for their child
to learn in, whether the school is public, private or religious in
nature.
15
With all of this in mind, this Comment will examine one of the
most important initiatives to face the Pennsylvania General
11. See BENNETr, supra note 2, at 66. "Choice among schools is a first involvement in
the schools, a critical investment, and it may lead to further involvement, which is something
teachers long for .... The more we can do to involve (or reinvolve) parents, the better."
Id.
12. See id. at 44. Dr. Bennett points out that teachers' unions and the education
establishment opposed the Reagan administration's school voucher proposals. See id. at 65.
The Council of Great City Schools called it "ridiculous;" the National School Board Associa-
tion called the proposal "a Trojan horse;" the National Parent-Teacher Association referred
to it as "offensive;" the National Education Association dubbed the voucher proposal a
"sham;" and the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) said that the proposal amounted
to "cannibalization." Id. Dr. Bennett believes that these organizations oppose reform
because the educational establishment is interested in maintaining power, and, consequently,
"our children pay the highest price." BENNETT, supra note 2, at 44. Another proponent of
school choice, Clint Bolick of the Institute for Justice, offered a more specific criticism of the
opponents of school choice in Pennsylvania. Mr. Bolick believes that the Pennsylvania State
Education Association's opposition to school vouchers-its president called school vouchers
a "cruel hoax to poor families, and a ticket to nowhere for most students"-shows that the
Association "values jobs above children's education." See Carol Innerst, School Choice Foes
Sue Small District in Pennsylvania, WASHINGTON TIMES, April 17, 1998 at A5. Governor
Ridge chooses to frame it another way: "[O]ur allegiance must be to our children and their
education-not the system that serves them." Governor Tom Ridge, 1999-2000 Budget
Presentation (visited February 2, 1999) <http://www.state.pa.us/PAExec/Governor/Speeches-
/990202-1.html>.
13. According to journalist George Will, "[albout 50 percent of urban area public school
teachers with school-age children send their children to private schools." RICHARD NIXON,
BEYOND PEACE 215 (1994)(offering the quotation from Mr. Will). See also Denis P. Doyle,
Where Connoisseurs Send Their Children to School: An Analysis of 1990 Census Data to
Determine Where Teachers Send Their Children To School, tbl. 19 (1995). According to Mr.
Doyle's May 1995 study, most urban public school teachers send their own children to
private schools rather than allow them to attend public schools. See id.
14. George Will poses the question, "[w]hat do they know that we ought to know?"
NIXON, supra note 13, at 215.
15. See BENNETT, supra note 2, at 64.
THE SCHOOL CHOICE DEBATE
Assembly in some time: an amendment to the Public School Code
of 1949 to allow for school choice. 6 Although the school choice
legislation proposed by Governor Tom Ridge was not voted on at
the close of the 1997-98 legislative session, it should be an issue "at
the forefront of the new session" starting in 1999.17 In fact, the
school choice proposal will reportedly top the Governor's agenda
for his second term, which begins in January 1999.18 Consequent-
ly, this Comment will address the constitutional issues surrounding
school choice, specifically whether the Pennsylvania school choice
legislation, which allows for parental choice of religious schools,
violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment 19 to the
United States Constitution.20
II. Background
A. The Establishment Clause
Because the debate over the constitutionality of school choice
hinges on a court's interpretation of the Establishment Clause, an
16. Several law review articles have been written on the constitutionality of voucher
programs/school choice. See, e.g., Michael J. Stick, Educational Vouchers: A Constitutional
Analysis, 28 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 423 (1995); Harlan A. Loeb & Debbie N. Kaminer,
God, Money, and Schools: Voucher Programs Impugn the Separation of Church and State,
30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1 (1996); and Kristen K. Waggoner, Comment, The Milwaukee
Parental Choice Program: The First Voucher System to Include Religious Schools, 7 REGENT
U.L. REV. 165 (1996). Especially noteworthy is a law review article discussing the validity
of school choice proposals under the Pennsylvania Constitution. See William B. Ball,
Economic Freedom of Parental Choice in Education: The Pennsylvania Constitution, 101
DICK. L. REV. 261 (1997). Many others have written on this topic as well.
17. Krebs, supra note 9, at Al (quoting Pennsylvania Senate Majority Leader F. Joseph
Loeper).
18. See HARRISBURG PATRIOT-NEWS, January 20, 1999, at B5-6 (re-printed text of
Governor Ridge's inaugural address in which the Governor makes a case for nonpublic
school choice). See also Dennis Barbagello, Ridge to Finish State Business, TRIBUNE-
REVIEW, December 20, 1998, at A4 ("Ridge left little doubt he will pursue some unfinished
business. Topping the agenda will be a controversial school choice proposal.").
19. See U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl.1.
20. While a court challenge to Governor Ridge's school choice proposal is expected if
and when the legislature passes it, the opposition would not be the first in Pennsylvania.
Following the Southeast Delaware County School Board's unanimous vote in March 1998
to issue vouchers to children in an effort to ease overcrowding, the Pennsylvania State
Education Association and fourteen other organizations filed suit against the school district.
See Innerst, supra note 12, at A5. The Board's plan was to give vouchers ranging in value
from $250 for kindergarten to $1000 for high school to parents who send their children to
private schools or to public schools outside the district. See id. This voucher plan, which was
the first to be implemented in Pennsylvania, would allow parents to select religiously affiliat-
ed schools for their children. See id.
1999]
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overview of the Clause and the intention behind it is necessary.
The language that is at the heart of the debate appears in the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution as follows:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ... .",,' This
clause was adopted as part of the Bill of Rights, which were the
first ten amendments to the Constitution ratified in 1791.22
Although the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868, the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment was not made
applicable to the states until 1940.23
The Establishment Clause provides that there cannot be an
officially recognized creed or religion in the United States-that,
"officially, all religious doctrines are equal., 24  James Madison,
who proposed the First Amendment in Congress, understood the
meaning of the Establishment Clause to be "that Congress should
not establish a religion, and enforce the legal observation of it by
law, nor compel men to worship God in any manner contrary to
their conscience. 25  However, this does not mean that the
Framers intended to dismiss religion as unnecessary to the public
good. 6 They believed that "the public virtues inculcated by
religion are a public good.,
27
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has not interpret-
ed the Establishment Clause as demanding "indifference" to
religion in general.' In fact, the Court stated that the Constitu-
tion "affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance,
of all religions ... Anything less would require the 'callous indiffer-
21. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
22. See ROBERT S. ALLEY, THE SUPREME COURT ON CHURCH AND STATE 3 (1988).
23. See id. at 4. Specifically, the United States Supreme Court made religion clauses
applicable to the states in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). Cantwell
concerned a Connecticut law that denied free exercise of religion. See id. The Court stated
that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent
as Congress to enact such laws." Id.
24. WALTER BERNS, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 19 (1976).
25. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 421 (quoting 1 ANNULS OF CONGRES 730
(statement of Mr. Madison).
26. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 400
(1993) (Scalia, J., concuring).
27. Id.
28. See id. Justice Scalia then cited cases, both old and recent, to support his point. See,
e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952) (explaining that "[w]hen the state
encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the
schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions.").
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ence' [the Court has] said was never intended ...."" Further-
more, the Supreme Court prefers "noninterference and noninvolve-
ment with the religious," and prohibits "a brooding and pervasive
devotion to the secular and a passive, or even active, hostility to
the religious."3°
Nonetheless, many believe the Founding Fathers insisted on
complete separation between religion and government. Although
advocates of "absolute separation" of church and state focus on
Thomas Jefferson's famous statement, "building a wall of separa-
tion between Church and State,"" it is appropriate to look at
more than just this particular statement.32 Indeed, on other
occasions, Jefferson himself made statements that may seem to
contradict this famous "admonition."
For example, Jefferson "saw merit (and no violation of
principle) in a program featuring a sharing of facilities" between
church-related schools and public schools. 33 He even believed that
the establishment of religious schools within the confines of the
University of Virginia "would complete the circle of the useful
sciences embraced by this institution, and would fill the chasm now
existing, on principles which would leave inviolate the constitutional
29. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984) (citation omitted). The Court went on
to declare that its precedents plainly show that "on occasion some advancement of religion
will result from governmental action." Id. at 683.
30. County of Allegheny v. ACLU of Greater Pittsburgh, 492 U.S. 573, 659 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy believes that the Supreme Court has disclosed
two principles with respect to the Establishment Clause:
[G]overnment may not coerce anyone to support or participate in any religion or
its exercise; and it may not, in the guise of avoiding hostility or callous indiffer-
ence, give direct benefits to religion in such a degree thaf it in fact "establishes a
[state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so."
Id. (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 659).
31. 8 WRMNGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 113 (H. Washington ed. 1861). The United
States Supreme Court summarized its interpretation of the Establishment Clause while
deciding Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947), and used Jefferson's phrase
in the decision. However, according to Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, "[it is
impossible to build sound constitutional doctrine upon a mistaken understanding of
constitutional history, but unfortunately the Establishment Clause has been expressly
freighted with Jefferson's misleading metaphor for nearly 40 years[,]" since the Court's
decision in Everson. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
"[S]tare decisis may bind courts as to matters of law, but it cannot bind them as to matters
of history." Id. at 99.
32. As Berns emphasizes, more than one person's views, whether that person is
Jefferson or James Madison, went into the formation of the First Amendment. See BERNS,
supra note 24, at 9.
33. Id. at 74.
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freedom of religion. . . ."' Jefferson felt that using a public
institution to offer religious education would be beneficial to
society, and consequently he did not wish to absolutely separate
church and state in this regard.35 While this sentiment by Jeffer-
son appears to be on point on the issue of school vouchers for
religious schools, it is best to explore the ideas and motives behind
the Establishment Clause further.
Other issues that the First Congress dealt with are relevant to
this discussion of the intention of the Establishment Clause as well.
Furthermore, these issues place the debate in its proper context.
In 1789, the First Congress reaffirmed the Northwest Ordinance of
1787, which contained the following language in its third article:
"Religion, morality, and knowledge, being necessary to good
government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means
of education shall forever be encouraged."'  Walter Berns, a
noted constitutional author, comments that "[it is not easy to see
how Congress, or a territorial government acting under the
authority of Congress, could promote religious and moral education
under a Constitution that promoted 'the absolute separation of
church and state' and forbade all forms of assistance to religion."37
In addition to this Act, there are many other examples of the
First Congress involving religion with government programs.
Specifically, Congress set aside land in the Northwest Territory and
other territories for the use of schools, many of which "undoubted-
ly were church-affiliated sectarian institutions as there was no
requirement that the schools be 'public.' "38 Indeed, Americans
from 1789 to 1825 commonly accepted and practiced governmental
aid to religion and sectarian educational institutions.3 9 Another
example of direct public funding of religious activities is evidenced
in the First Congress's decision to elect chaplains for the House and
Senate,' as well as the military.4' As the provisions of the
34. McCollum v. Board of Educ 333 U.S. 203, 245 n. 11 (1948) (Reed, J., dissenting).
35. See BERNS, supra note 24, at 74.
36. Act of August 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 STATUTES AT LARGE 50, 52 n.(a).
37. BERNS, supra note 24, at 8.
38. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 862 (1995)
(Thomas, J., concurring).
39. See id.
40. See S. Jour., 1st Cong., 1st Sess., 10 (1820); H.R. Jour., 1st Cong., 1st Sess., 26 (1826).
41. See 1 STATUTES AT LARGE 222.
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House and Senate chaplain statute indicate, the chaplain's salary
was to be paid out of the national treasury.'
Still other examples of early public actions in this area
illustrate that the Framers did not intend to absolutely separate
religion and government. President George Washington, in his
First Inaugural Address, paid "homage to the Great Author of
every public and private good" and suggested that Americans must
"acknowledge and adore the Invisible Hand which conducts the
affairs of men."43 In fact, Presidents are regularly asked by
Congress to give proclamations of "public thanksgiving and
prayer," and the early Presidents who did so were instrumental as
Founding Fathers of our nation and its Constitution.' Finally,
and ironically in light of the litigation that the Establishment
Clause has caused, the United States Supreme Court sits in a
courtroom with a painting of Moses and the Ten Command-
ments.
45
42. See Act of Sept. 22, 1789, ch. 17, § 4, 1 STATUTES AT LARGE 70, 71.
43. INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES FROM
GEORGE WASHINGTON 1789 TO GEORGE BUSH 1989 2 (Bicentennial ed. 1989). "Statements
similar to these can be collected in the hundreds-and have been-to the end of supporting
the proposition that the United States is, or was intended to be, a Christian or, less
specifically, a religious commonwealth .. " BERNS, supra note 24, at 12 (citing RUSSELL
KIRK, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN ORDER (1974) as an example of such a compilation).
44. See ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT
AND CURRENT FICTION 53 (1988).
45. See ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH, MODERN LIBERALISM
AND THE AMERICAN DECLINE 289 (1996). Bork finds it hard to believe that the Framers
and Ratifiers of the First Amendment would have anticipated that the Supreme Court, sitting
in the room described,
would hold it an unconstitutional establishment of religion for a high school to
have a copy of the Ten Commandments on a wall. Nor could they have supposed
that when a public school system provided remedial education to educationally
deprived children, those children from religious schools would have to leave the
premises and receive the instruction in trailers.
Id. at 289-90. Bork points to a dissenting opinion by Justice Stewart as a correct
constitutional interpretation of the establishment clause:
[A] compulsory state educational system so structures a child's life that if religious
exercises are to be an impermissible activity in schools, religion is placed at an
artificial and state-created disadvantage. Viewed in this light, permission of such
exercises for those who want them is necessary if the schools are truly to be
neutral in the matter of religion. And a refusal to permit religious exercises thus
is seen, not as the realization of state neutrality, but rather as the establishment
of a religion of secularism, or at the least, as government support of the beliefs of
those who think that religious exercises should be conducted only in private.
Id. (quoting Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 313 (1963) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting)).
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All of the above tends to support the notion that the Framers
did not envision the "absolute separation" of church and state that
many historical revisionists- and judges-argue for today. The
Framers simply did not want the kind of state-supported religion
seen in the likes of England. Furthermore, the Framers understood
that many colonists emigrated to America in search of religious
freedom, and this understanding was reflected in the Establishment
Clause. In short, the Establishment Clause was intended to
prohibit the establishment of a national religion while providing
that Americans were free to practice the religion of their choice.
B. The Milwaukee Parental Choice Program and Ensuing
Litigation in Jackson v. Benson
In an attempt to reform the beleaguered Milwaukee public
school system, Wisconsin Governor Tommy Thompson introduced
the original Milwaukee Parental Choice Program ("original
MPCP").46 The Wisconsin legislature enacted the original MPCP
in 1989. 47 In 1995 the legislature made a number of amendments
to the original MPCP. 48 The amended MPCP was the source of
the recent Wisconsin Supreme Court decision in Jackson v.
Benson,49 where that court validated the program and concluded
that it did not violate the Establishment Clause.5° Consequently,
a brief overview of the amended MPCP is necessary to place the
Pennsylvania school choice legislation, and possible litigation that
may result, in its proper context.
Four years after the original MPCP was implemented, the
Wisconsin legislature, as part of its 1995-96 biennial budget bill,
significantly revised the original MPCP. 51 One of the major
amendments to the original program was the removal of the
limitation that participating schools be "nonsectarian."52  Thus,
46. See Davis v. Grover, 480 N.W.2d 460, 470 (Wis. 1992). The court in Davis
commented that the Milwaukee Public Schools serve a largely impoverished minority
population of students who consistently perform well below their counterparts in other areas
of Wisconsin. See id. (citing Milwaukee Public Schools, Indicators of Educational Effective-
ness); see also Waggoner, supra note 16.
47. See 1989 Wis. Act 336.
48. See 1995 Wis. Act 27, §§ 4002-4009.
49. 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998).
50. See id. at 620.
51. See 1995 Wis. Act 27, §§ 4002-4009.
52. See id. § 4002.
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this allowed students to attend private, religious schools in
Milwaukee.53 Second, the 1995 amendments increased to 15
percent the total percentage of Milwaukee public school students
allowed to participate in the program.54
The third key amendment to the MPCP was the deletion of
the requirement that the State Superintendent of Public Instruction
conduct annual performance evaluations and report to the
legislature.55 The amendments also eliminated the Superinten-
dent's authority to conduct financial or performance evaluation
audits of the program.56 Instead, the state superintendent shall
"monitor" the performance of the pupils attending private schools
under the MPCP.57
In addition, the amended MPCP requires the state to pay the
aid to each participating student's parent or guardian, rather than
paying the participating schools directly.58  The state will "send
the check to the private school," and the parent or guardian shall
"restrictively endorse the check for the use of the private
school."59 The amount paid will be the lesser of the Milwaukee
public school per student aid or the "private school's operating and
debt service cost per pupil that is related to educational program-
ming."'" Finally, the amended MPCP contains a provision that
the private school may not require a student to participate in any
religious activity if the student's parent or guardian submits a
written request of exemption.6'
Under the amended MPCP, the legislature requires participat-
ing students and schools to meet additional qualifications. 62 First,
the student has to be a student in kindergarten through twelfth
grade.63 Second, the participating student has to be from a family
whose income did not exceed 1.75 times the federal poverty
53. See id.
54. See id. As amended in 1993, the original MPCP restricted enrollment to only 1.5
percent of the Milwaukee public schools. See Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 607.
55. See id.
56. See 1995 Wis. Act 27, § 4008m.
57. See id.
58. See id. § 4006m.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See 1995 Wis. Act 27, § 4008e.
62. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 119.23(2)(a)(1)-(2) (West 1991).
63. See id. § 119.23(2).
1999]
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level.' Finally, the student has to be either enrolled in a public
school in Milwaukee, attending a private school under this
program, or not enrolled in school during the previous year.65
With respect to the participating private schools, they have to
comply with section 2000d of Title 42' and all health and safety
laws or codes that apply to Wisconsin public schools.67
The expansion of the MPCP to private, religious schools
prompted immediate litigation, as opponents, including the
Milwaukee Teachers Education Association, challenged the
amended MPCP under the Establishment Clause of the United
States Constitution, the Wisconsin Constitution, and the Wisconsin
public purpose doctrine.' The Wisconsin circuit court held that
the amended MPCP violated the religious beliefs and compelled
support clauses of the Wisconsin Constitution, as well as the public
purpose doctrine as the program applied to sectarian schools.69
However, the court did not address the federal Establishment
Clause challenge because it had already invalidated the program on
state constitutional grounds.7 °  Similarly, the court of appeals
struck down the amended MPCP due to state constitutional issues,
and therefore found it "unnecessary" to reach the federal constitu-
tional issues.7'
After nearly three years of litigation, the amended MPCP was
ultimately validated by the Wisconsin Supreme Court.72 The court
concluded that the program did not infringe upon the state
constitution or public purpose doctrine.73 More importantly for
the purposes of this analysis, the court held that the amended
MPCP does not violate the Establishment Clause.74 Relying on
the same precedent as will be examined later in this Comment, the
court felt that the amended MPCP has a secular purpose, it does
64. See id. § 119.23(2)(a)(1).
65. See id. § 119.23(2)(a)(2).
66. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994) (providing that "[n]o person in the United States shall,
on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participating in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance.").
67. See WIs. STAT. ANN. § 119.23(2)(a)(4)-(5) (West 1991).
68. See Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 609 (Wis. 1998).
69. See id. at 609-10.
70. See id. at 610.
71. See id.
72. See id. at 632.
73. See Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 607.
74. See id., at 611.
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not have the primary purpose of advancing religion, and it does not
lead to excessive entanglement between the State and participating
private sectarian schools.75
The Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision was subsequently
appealed to the United States Supreme Court. The Justices, by an
8 to 1 vote, declined to hear the case, thus allowing the Wisconsin
court's approval of nonpublic school choice.76 Although the
United States Supreme Court's decision does not set any legal
precedent, it leaves the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision as the
highest court determination on the issue of school vouchers for
private sectarian schools.77
III. The Pennsylvania School Choice Proposal
On May 9, 1995, Governor Tom Ridge proposed his Keystone
Initiative for a Difference in Our Schools ("KIDS") to reform and
improve Pennsylvania's education system.7" KIDS was designed
to improve education through a variety of reform measures,
including school choice, charter schools, competition, and local
control.7 9 Governor Ridge's first plan was narrowly defeated in the
Pennsylvania House of Representatives and faced a questionable
future in the Senate, and thus the Governor withdrew the propos-
al.80
Undeterred by his first bout with the legislature, Governor
Ridge re-introduced his school choice legislation in November of
1998, and again in February 1999.81 On June 16th, the Governor's
proposal for school choice, at this point a diluted compromise bill
75. See id.
76. See Kim Asch, High Court Upholds School Vouchers, WASHINGTON TIMES,
November 10, 1998. The Justices did not give an explanation as to why they did not accept
the case. See id. "Wisconsin Governor Thompson praised the Court for clearing the way
for impoverished families who want a better life for the children to choose schools that make
the most sense to them. It's a victory for hope." Id.
77. Pete Hutchinson, general counsel for the pro-voucher Landmark Legal Foundation,
said the Court's action "sends the signal that programs like the Milwaukee choice plan is
legal." Id.
78. See Heritage Foundation, School Choice Programs 1998: Pennsylvania (visited
October 19, 1998) <http://www.heritage.org/schools/pennsylvania.html>.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. Governor Ridge announced his most recent intention to re-introduce his school
choice legislation in his 1999-2000 Budget Presentation, February 2, 1999. See Governor Tom
Ridge 1999-2000 Budget Presentation (visited February 3,1999) <http://www.state.pa.us/PA_/-
Exec/Governor/Speeches/990202-1.html>.
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intended to satisfy a myriad of concerns,82 could not muster
enough support to bring a vote on his plan in the Pennsylvania
House.83 Thus, the Governor failed in his attempt to have Penn-
sylvania become the second state, after Florida, to offer state-wide
school choice.'
Nonetheless, even in the wake of his latest loss, the Governor
continues to support school choice and will not give up the fight:
" 'It's a high hurdle. It's a steep climb, but it's not Everest, and
I'm not finished climbing.' ,85 Consequently, and even though the
diluted compromise bill that scaled back the breadth of the original
proposal was defeated, this Comment will address the implications
of Governor Ridge's original-and broader-school choice
legislation.
Governor Ridge's original school choice proposal was based
upon his belief that school-age residents, their parents, and the
Commonwealth would benefit from a program of economic
assistance that gives parents the ability to choose the educational
environment best suited to their child's needs.' Further, the
legislation declared that the "legitimate interest and governmental
duty ... in facilitating education of the highest quality for children
of this Commonwealth is enhanced by encouraging competitive and
82. The compromise plan that had been drafted over the final several weeks before the
failed attempt contained several changes from the Governor's original proposal. See Jan
Murphy, Officials Edgy Over Plan for Vouchers, HARRISBURG PATRIOT-NEWS, June 16,
1999, at B1. The compromise, called the "Educational Empowerment Act," would have
allowed all school districts the option of enacting a locally funded voucher plan. See id. The
school districts that did elect to do so, however, would lose state funding for every student
who exercised choice. See id. In addition, districts that are identified as "academically
distressed" would have two to three years to show improvement before the state would take
them over and offer "supervouchers" worth anywhere from $2,000 to $4,000. See id.
83. Charles Thompson, Changes Doomed Vouchers, HARRISBURG PATRIOT-NEWS, June
20, 1999, at Al (commenting that "the school-choice effort fizzled into a non-vote on a
watered-down compromise plan.").
84. Florida Gov. Jeb Bush signed the new religious school voucher program in law on
June 21, 1999. See CHURCH AND STATE, July 1999, at 52. The plan, called the "Opportunity
Scholarship Program," allows students attending public schools deemed "failing" by the state
to transfer to religious and other private schools at taxpayer expense, using vouchers worth
$4,000. See id. Americans United, along with a broad array of educational and public policy
groups, filed suit in state court in Tallahassee the next day. See id.
85. HARRISBURG PATRIOT-NEWS, Heard on the Hill, June 18, 1999, at B3 (quoting
Governor Ridge at his 4:00 a.m. press conference after his failed attempt to have his school
voucher plan brought to a vote in the House). Ridge was also quoted as saying that "the
Governor's got 3 more years to get it right." Peter L. Decoursey, HARRISBURG PATRIOT-
NEWS, Did Effort on Vouchers Hurt Ridge or Not?, June 20, 1999, at Fl.
86. See Pennsylvania School Choice Legislation, § 1301-B(a)(8) (1998).
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diverse alternatives for parents and students that enable them to
choose from both public and nonpublic educational programs.
87
In his 1999 Inaugural Address, Governor Ridge summed up his
reasoning for advocating school choice:
[W]e also support school choice because parents, not govern-
ment- parents, not government-must ultimately decide what's
best for their children. What's best for the children-what's
best for the children is the only bottom line that counts.'
The Pennsylvania school choice legislation offered by Gover-
nor Ridge would have empowered parents with the financial
support to send their children to the private or religious school of
their choice.89 This financial support would have come in the
form of "educational opportunity grants."' The legislation would
also have allowed public school students who are not grant
recipients to choose to attend a public school outside their district
of residence.9 It would have been phased in beginning in the
1999-2000 school year92 and would include income eligibility
caps.93  In addition, the plan was scheduled to last five years,
94
with an assessment to be conducted after the fourth year.95 The
"sun-set" provision would become effective unless the legislation is
reenacted. 96 School choice was to begin in the poorest one-third
of state school districts, as measured by the percentage of welfare
recipients in each district.97
The Governor's proposed school choice legislation limited the
students eligible for participation in the program. During the first
year, financial support would have been restricted to families
earning $15,000 or less.98 Then, in the second, third, fourth and
87. Id. § 1301-B(a)(4).
88. HARRISBURG PATRIOT-NEWS, supra note 18, at B6 (re-printed text of Governor
Ridge's inaugural address).
89. See Pennsylvania School Choice Legislation § 1301-B.
90. See id. § 1302-B. "Educational Opportunity Grant" is defined as "a grant awarded
to the parents of an eligible grant recipient pursuant to this article." Id.
91. See id. § 1303-B(a).
92. See id. § 1303-B(a).
93. See Pennsylvania School Choice Legislation § 1304-B(b)(2).
94. See id. § 1307-B.
95. See id. § 1309-B(a).
96. See id. § 1307-B.
97. See Ridge Budget Helps Public Schools, Initiates Landmark School-Choice Program,
(visited July 22, 1998) <http://www.state.pa.us/PAExec/Govemor-/PressReleases /budschl
.html>.
98. See Pennsylvania School Choice Legislation § 1304-B(b)(2).
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fifth years, the income gap would have risen to $25,000, $35,000,
$50,000 and eventually $75,000, respectively.99
After meeting the eligibility requirements, the Commonwealth
would have made the educational opportunity grant award to the
parents of each eligible grant recipient, rather than paying the
participating school directly.1"0 The parents would receive a
voucher of up to $350 for the cost of half-day kindergarten. 1°'
For children in full-day kindergarten or in first through eighth
grades, parents could receive up to $700."° Families of ninth-
through twelfth-grade students would receive up to $1,000.13
However, the proposal did not allow the vouchers to exceed the
cost of a school's tuition."
A "hold-harmless" provision within the legislation would have
ensured that no public school district would receive less state
funding as a result of educational opportunity grants.105 This
provision was developed as a response to the defeat of Governor
Ridge's first attempt at school choice and should dispel one of the
greatest fears opponents have of school choice."° As a result of
this additional language, the proposed legislation ensured "that no
public school district will receive less money as a result of
choice."'0 7  After the five-year period of implementation, the
money the state would have saved from the program would be
placed in a fund to be distributed to rural and financially distressed
school districts.
108
Other important provisions within the proposed legislation
limited the Commonwealth's power vis-A-vis the nonpublic schools.
One such limit was that the Commonwealth did not have the
authority to impose any additional requirements of nonpublic
schools that are not otherwise authorized by the laws of Pennsylva-
99. See id.
100. See id. § 1304-B(b).
101. See id. § 1304-B(b)(4).
102. See id. § 1304-B(b)(3).
103. See Pennsylvania School Choice Legislation § 1304-B(b)(5).
104. See id. § 1304-B(b)(1).
105. See Ridge Releases Details of New School-Reform Plan, (visited February 3, 1999)
<http://www.state.pa.us/PAExec/Governor/PressReleases/choice08.html>.
106. As Governor Ridge stated, "[Olne of the most frequently heard criticisms of our
first proposal was that certain public school districts would be badly hurt, because many
students would depart and their state subsidy would plummet. Now, that argument
disappears." Id.
107. Id.
108. See Krebs, supra note 9.
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nia.1° Moreover, the proposed legislation specifically exempted
the program from review, regulation or approval by the State
Board of Education." ° In addition, the Commonwealth could not
compel any nonpublic school to accept or enroll eligible grant
recipients."' 1
Another limitation on the Commonwealth pertained to the
evaluation of the school choice programs. The evaluation would
consider academic performance, academic programs, parental
involvement, and parental satisfaction. 1 2  With respect to the
participating nonpublic schools, they were only required to provide
information to the extent that the information required is "readily
available" and "does not require the administration of any
additional tests or other academic assessments or require significant
additional data collection by the school."
'1 3
Additionally, the legislation included a provision for eligible
grant recipients in an academically bankrupt school district,"
14
meaning school-age residents of the Commonwealth of Pennsylva-
nia who reside "in a school district certified as academically
bankrupt under this article.""' 5 Those students would have been
entitled to grants equal to the local school districts' per-pupil
expenditure." 6 A requirement of students receiving an educa-
tional opportunity grant in an academically bankrupt school district
was that the student must participate in the Pennsylvania State
System of Assessments."7 If, however, upon inspection of the
assessments the parents or guardians find the assessments in
conflict with their religious beliefs, then the student may have been
excused upon written request by the parents or guardians to the
principal of the nonpublic school."8
109. See Pennsylvania School Choice Legislation § 1304-B(h).
110. See id. § 1304-B(g).
111. See id. § 1304-Bj).
112. See id. § 1309-B(c).
113. Id. § 1309-B(e).
114. See Pennsylvania School Choice Legislation § 1306-B.
115. Id. § 1302-B (definition section of the proposed legislation).
116. See id. § 1306-B(d).
117. See id. § 1306-B(h).
118. See id.
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IV. The Pennsylvania School Choice Legislation Does Not
Violate the Establishment Clause of the United States
Constitution
The Pennsylvania school voucher legislation, as it was
originally drafted, did not violate the Establishment Clause of the
United States Constitution. Although the proposed legislation
would allow parents to use vouchers at religious schools, it does not
involve any state action other than providing grants to parents to
use at the school of their choice.119 Parental choice insulates the
program from any possibility of state action advancing religion.
The United States Supreme Court developed a three-prong
test for facing Establishment Clause challenges to legislation while
deciding Lemon v. Kurtzman in 1971.12 In more recent opinions,
many of the sitting Justices have expressed displeasure with the
Lemon test.'21 In fact, the Court has stated that the Lemon test
is merely a "helpful signpost" or "guideline" to assist the Court,
and not a comprehensive, singular test.122 However, because of
the attention that courts give to the Lemon test when facing
Establishment Clause challenges, it seems clear that the Lemon test
would be applied to the Pennsylvania school choice legislation as
well.
The Pennsylvania legislation must fulfill all three of the Lemon
test's prongs.123 First, the legislation must have a secular pur-
pose.124 Second, its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion.125 Finally, the legislation
must not foster excessive governmental entanglement with
religion.
126
119. See Pennsylvania School Choice Legislation § 1304-B(b).
120. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
121. See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384,
398-400 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 108 (1985) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655-57 (1998) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part); Corporation of Presiding Bishop of
Church of Jesus Christ Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 346-49 (1987) (O'Connor,
J., concurring); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 644 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice
Scalia was joined, inter alios by Justice Thomas. See id.
122. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973).
123. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613-14.
124. See id. at 612.
125. See id. (quoting Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968)).
126. See id. at 613 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)).
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As it was written, the proposed Pennsylvania school choice
legislation passed the Supreme Court's Lemon test. First, the
primary purpose of the Pennsylvania school choice legislation is to
advance the secular goal of education, and not the promotion of
any one religion.127 Indeed, the legislation contained language
that declared that it was offering school choice only to "facilitat[e]
education of the highest quality for children of this Common-
wealth.""1
Second, the proposed legislation does not provide direct aid to
a religious school or any religion, but rather direct aid to parents
and their children.12 9 The Pennsylvania school choice legislation
provides only a "shadow of incidental benefit" to a non-public
institution1 3 -if, and only if, parents choose a religious school for
their children. Any money that ultimately goes to a religious
institution in Pennsylvania will do so "only as a result of the
genuinely independent and private choices of individuals.
131
Finally, the legislation does not excessively entangle the Common-
wealth with religion. In fact, the legislation has specific exemptions
for the nonpublic schools with respect to the Commonwealth's
administration of those institutions.
132
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Agostini
v. Felton,3 ' Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District,134 Witt-
ers v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind,35 and
Mueller v. Allen'36 provide precedent in support the constitu-
tionality of the Pennsylvania school choice legislation. In these
decisions the Supreme Court has consistently upheld programs
analogous to school voucher programs designed for religious
schools.131 The Court has done so on grounds that the programs
provide benefits to individual citizens who themselves made the
127. See id. § 1301-B.
128. Pennsylvania School Choice Legislation, § 1301-B(a)(4) (1998).
129. See id. § 1304-B(b).
130. See State ex rel. Warren v. Nusbaum, 219 N.W.2d 577 (Wis. 1974).
131. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 226 (1997).
132. See Pennsylvania School Choice Legislation §§ 1304-B(h); 1304-B(g); 1304-B(j);
1304-B(e); and 1306-B(h).
133. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
134. 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
135. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
136. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
137. See Agostini, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S.
1 (1993); Witters v. Washington Dep't of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); Mueller
v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
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choice of where to spend their benefits.13 s Thus, if citizens
choose to use benefits at religious institutions, they do so without
conferring any governmental preference, and without becoming
excessively entangled regulating how the benefits were used. 39
The Court's decisions compel the conclusion that the Pennsylvania
school voucher legislation, which would allow for educational
opportunity grants to be used at religious schools, does not violate
the establishment clause.
In Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District, parents sought
a sign language interpreter under a state program for their deaf
son, even though he attended a religious school.'" The district
court refused, claiming that this would constitute direct aid to a
pervasively sectarian institution and excessively entangle the district
with religion. 4' The court of appeals affirmed the district court,
and based its decision on the fact that the government employee,
the sign language interpreter, would be on the school premises
interpreting religious as well as secular statements.
142
The Supreme Court rejected this argument.43  First, the
Court recognized that there is no per se bar against public assis-
tance to religious schools.'" Second, the Court held that such
assistance, which is generally available to all other families with
disabled students, directly benefited the parent or student, not the
religious school. 45 The Court concluded:
The service at issue in this case is part of a general government
program that distributes benefits neutrally to any child qualify-
ing [under the Act], without regard to the 'sectarian-nonsectari-
an, or public-nonpublic nature' of the school the child attends.
By according parents freedom to select a school of their choice,
the statute ensures that a government-paid interpreter will be
present in a sectarian school only as a result of the private
decision of individual parents."
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 4.
141. See id. at 5.
142. See id.
143. See id. at 12.
144. See id. at 8.
145. See Zobrest, 509 at 9.
146. Id. at 10.
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Likewise, in Mueller v. Allen, 47 the United States Supreme
Court upheld a Minnesota statute allowing parents an income tax
deduction for certain educational expenses, even if the child attends
a religious school. 48 Because this benefit was generally available
to parents who independently chose how to use it, the Minnesota
statute did not have the primary effect of advancing religion.
149
The Court stated:
Where, as here, aid to parochial schools is available only as a
result of decisions of individual parents no "imprimatur of state
approval" can be deemed to have been conferred on any
particular religion, or on religion generally.'5°
Neutrally-available state aid cannot be withheld from benefi-
ciaries simply because the recipient intends to use it at a religious
school. 5' In fact, in Witters v. Washington Department of Services
for the Blind, the United States Supreme Court held that the State
of Washington could not withhold vocational assistance from a
qualified beneficiary simply because he intended to use the benefit
at a Bible school. 52 The Court rejected the notion that this was
a "direct subsidy" of the Bible school or an endorsement of
religious activity simply because the student chose the Bible school
over the other public institutions."'53 Significantly, it was the
student's ability to independently choose where to attend school
that persuaded the Court that there would be no direct aid to
religious institutions.'54 As the Court stated, the aid ultimately
flowing to the Bible school did so "only as a result of the genuinely
independent and private choices of aid recipients.' 55
The critical element underlying the decisions in Zobrest,
Mueller, and Witters is that the government benefit flowed to the
recipient, who then decided independently of the government
where the benefit would be spent. In one of its more recent
decisions on the subject, the Supreme Court, in Agostini v. Felton,
upheld the use of Title I funds on parochial school property as a
147. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
148. See id. at 388.
149. See id. at 399.
150. Id. (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 (1981)).
151. See Witters v. Washington Dep't of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
152. See id. at 489.
153. See id. at 488-89.




neutral benefit provided to students. The Supreme Court stressed
the importance of allowing the individual to choose where the
benefit is used:
Even though the [Witters] grant recipient clearly would use the
money to obtain religious education . . . the tuition grants were
"made available generally without regard to the sectarian-
nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of the institution
benefited.
' 156
The Court's emphasis on the fact that the educational grants
were disbursed directly to students, who then used the money to
pay for tuition at the school of their choice,'57 is especially
relevant when examining the Pennsylvania school choice legislation.
The Court finds this situation "no different from a State's issuing
a paycheck to one of its employees, knowing that the employee
would donate part or all of the check to a religious institution."
"In both situations, any money that ultimately went to religious
institutions did so 'only as a result of the genuinely independent
and private choices of' individuals.""1 8
Likewise, the emphasis of the Pennsylvania school choice
legislation is to provide parental choice,15 9 accomplishing the same
degree of independent decision-making that the Supreme Court
found essential to the programs upheld in Agostini,6  Zobrest,6 '
Mueller,'6 2 and Witters. 63 Under the Pennsylvania school choice
legislation, the money provided under the educational opportunity
grant goes to the individual parent, and not to the church-run
school."6  It is the parent who has the right to choose whether
the benefit will be spent at a religious or non-religious school, or
whether to apply for the program at all.
In Strout v. Albanese, the highest court decision yet on the
issue of school choice, the First Circuit Court of Appeals declared
156. Agostini v. Fenton, 521 U.S. 203, 225 (1997) (quoting Witters v. Washington Dep't
of Servs. for Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986)).
157. See id.
158. Id. at 226 (quoting Committee for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413
U.s. 756, 782-83 n.38 (1973)).
159. See Pennsylvania School Choice Legislation § 1301-B (8)-(9) (1998).
160. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 224-28.
161. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 10 (1993).
162. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 399 (1983).
163. See Witters v. Washington Dept. of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487-88
(1986).
164. See Pennsylvania School Choice Legislation § 1304-B(b).
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that it would be unconstitutional to extend a Maine school subsidy
program to include private sectarian schools.t65 The court came
to this conclusion because the Maine statute declared that the state
pay grants directly to qualified private nonsectarian educational
institutions.166  However, it is precisely the provision in the
Pennsylvania proposal which dictates that the voucher be given to
the directly to the parent-and not the religious school-that
makes the recent Strout decision a moot point. Therefore, in the
context of the proposed Pennsylvania school choice legislation, the
Strout decision is a hollow victory for school choice opponents.
Indeed, the Strout decision only reaffirms the principle
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Rosenberger v. Rector and
Visitors of the University of Virginia, that the Court "recognizes
special Establishment Clause dangers where the government makes
direct money payments to sectarian institutions., 167 Consequent-
ly, special cognizance should be taken of the undisputed fact that,
in the proposed Pennsylvania legislation, no public funds flow
directly to any private religious school." s
In short, children attending religious schools, and not the
sectarian schools themselves, are the beneficiaries of the education-
al opportunity grants under the proposed Pennsylvania school
choice legislation. The proposed legislation merely makes available
to all children the benefits of a general program. Parents and
children are the beneficiaries, not the religious schools. Parents are
thus free to spend their grant at whatever school they choose,
whether it is a public, private or religious institution.
V. Public Policy Arguments in Support of the Pennsylvania
School Choice Legislation
"Any objection that anyone would have to a voucher program
would have to be policy-based and could not rest on legal
doctrine. One would have to be awfully clumsy to write
165. 178 F.3d 57, 61-64 (1st Cir. 1999).
166. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 20-A, § 2951(2) (West 1993).
167. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 842 (1995).
168. Compare Pennsylvania School Choice Legislation § 1304-B(b), with Rosenberger, 515
U.S. at 842-44 (stating that no public funds flow directly into the Christian student organiza-
tion's coffers, but instead went to the publisher of the organization's student newspaper).
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voucher legislation that could not pass constitutional scruti-
ny .... [A]id to parents.., would be constitutional." '169
The primary effect of the Pennsylvania school choice legisla-
tion is to advance the Commonwealth's critical objective of
providing quality education to its children. The Governor and the
General Assembly, recognizing the need to improve the quality of
education, may create a general, secular school choice program for
parents and students. To open school choice to all schools,
including religious institutions, only effectively furthers the
Commonwealth's goal of providing better educational opportuni-
ties.
A. Examples of Existing Government-Sponsored Programs That
Aid Religious Institutions
The inclusion of religious groups in government-sponsored
programs is not a novel idea. In the education arena alone, many
state and federally operated programs put cash and other benefits
into the hands of eligible recipients who have the choice to spend
the entitlement wherever they wish. 7 ' Some students, including
those who attend religious schools, already receive benefits from
the government, such as school meals. 7' These students do not
forfeit the benefits to which they are entitled simply because they
choose to attend a religious school."
Another example of a government-sponsored education
program that includes religious groups can be found in the G.I.
Bill.'7 3 The G.I. Bill enables a veteran to use federal funds to
attend a religious school or seminary in addition to a public
school.17 4 The religious school is not the "recipient" of federal
funds; the individual simply chooses to use his voucher at that
school.
169. This quotation is attributed to Professor Laurence H. Tribe of Harvard Law School.
See Heritage Foundation, (visited February 9, 1999) <http://policyreview.com/jan99/quot-
es.html>.
170. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 231 (1997) (citing examples of sustained
programs providing aid to children regardless of what school they attended).
171. See 42 U.S.C. § 1755 (1994).
172. See 20 U.S.C. § 8893 (1994).
173. See 38 U.S.C. § 104 (1994).
174. See id. (approval of educational institutions under the G.I. Bill).
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Similarly, students are permitted to use government loans at
religious colleges and universities.
1 5  Under the Pell Grant,176
Stafford Loan 177 and Perkins Loan 78 programs, students have
a choice as to which school they would like to receive their money.
In fact, the school can be a religiously affiliated or a public
institution. Examples of these programs offering choice are
illustrated whenever a student uses this federal money to attend
Notre Dame, Liberty Baptist, Georgetown University, or even a
public school such as The University of North Carolina or The
Pennsylvania State University. William Bennett offers an appropri-
ate comment on this situation:
Broad choice in higher education hasn't hurt public higher
education; on the contrary, greater competition has helped it
and helped students. Why, then, do we not allow it at the
elementary and secondary levels, which are so much more
important and formative? 79
B. Evidence That School Choice Works
The belief that school choice will work in Pennsylvania is
supported by the effects of school choice in other school districts.
One illustration of the successful results of school choice is found
in the story of New York City's District 4.18o The improvement
in the public school system in local District 4 in New York's East
Harlem is astounding and represents the improvements that school
choice provides.
In 1974, the district began allowing parents to choose the
schools their children would attend.
18 '
Before choice was implemented only 15 percent of the students
in the district could read at grade level as District 4 ranked last in
reading scores among all the city's thirty-two school districts."
After choice 64 percent were at or above grade level in read-
175. See, e.g., The Federal Perkins Loan, 20 U.S.C. § 1087aa (1994); Robert H. Stafford
Loan, 20 U.S.C. § 1071 (1994); and the Pell Grant, 20 U.S.C. § 1070a (1994).
176. 20 U.S.C. § 1070a.
177. 20 U.S.C. § 1071.
178. 20 U.S.C. § 1087aa.
179. BENNETT, supra note 2, at 66.
180. See id. at 67.
181. See Nina Shokraii Rees, Public School Benefits of Private School Vouchers, POL'Y
REV., (January-February 1999).
182. See BENNETT, supra note 2, at 67.
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ing. 113 The success is further illustrated by a study that shows
that the number of students from the district who qualified for
admission to specialized high schools increased from ten to three
hundred." 4  Furthermore, in 1997, ten years after the school
choice plan was implemented, researchers found greater improve-
ments in the district's math and reading test scores than those
registered in New York's other thirty-one community school
districts.185  Moreover, these researchers concluded that the
increased number of choice schools in District 4 was directly
connected with the increases in math and reading scores.186
With respect to two of the newest school choice programs in
Cleveland and Milwaukee, it appears as though the programs work.
In Milwaukee, studies were conducted by Paul Peterson of Harvard
University and Jay Greene of the University of Texas, and also by
Cecilia Rouse of Princeton University. The Peterson-Greene study
showed that the difference in test scores between whites and
minorities narrowed by 33 percent to 50 percent after only three
years."8 The Rouse study found that the Milwaukee choice
program did increase the mathematical scores of participating
students.188 In addition, students were performing six percentage
points better in reading and eleven percentage points better in
math on the Iowa Test of Basic Skills.
1 89
Greene and Patterson were joined by William Howell of
Stanford University in evaluating the school choice program in
Cleveland. The study found improvements in students' reading and
math scores after only one year of attendance at the new
school' 9° The study shows that participating students scored five
percentage points higher in reading and fifteen percentage points
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In addition to the academic achievement scores exhibited by
the Cleveland study are some other noteworthy data. The
researchers found that sixty-three percent of the parents in the
choice program are "very satisfied" with the academic quality of
their chosen schools, compared with less than thirty percent of
public school parents.92 Furthermore, nearly sixty percent are
"very satisfied" with their school's safety record, compared with
just over twenty-five percent of public school parents.93 Also,
when asked what attracted them to the school choice program,
eighty-five percent of the participants cited "academic quality" as
a key reason for enrolling, while "greater safety" was second in
importance. 94
Although it is too early to draw any definitive conclusions, it
appears as though school choice works. The increases in academic
achievement are demonstrated in East Harlem's District 4,
Cleveland and Milwaukee, and thus improvements resulting from
school choice programs do not appear to be a fluke because of the
positive results occurring in each district. While every school
district may respond differently to school choice, it appears as
though school choice will succeed wherever it is implemented.
C. Arguments Against School Choice-And Why They Are
Wrong
Opponents of school choice make the same arguments against
school choice even in the face of statistics and evidence to the
contrary. The opponents contend that school choice would lead to
a further deterioration of the public school system; school choice
will leave the poorest students in the public schools; and the money
spent on school voucher programs would be better spent in the
public school system so that all children could benefit. Each of
these anti-school choice arguments can be refuted, however, by a
close examination of the facts and of the results of past programs.
Evidence of the effects of school choice in Albany, New York
demonstrates that the belief that school choice will have an adverse
effect on public schools is unfounded. In 1997, Virginia Gilder
offered vouchers of up to ninety percent of the cost of private
school tuition (up to $2000 per year) to parents whose children
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. The Center for Education Reform, supra note 189.
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attended Giffen Memorial Elementary School. 95 The voucher
program, known as A Brighter Choice Scholarships (ABCS), was
instituted because Giffen Elementary had the worst student
performance scores of any school in the region.196 Furthermore,
the school had repeatedly reported that over fifty percent of its
student body was not reading at state minimum competency
levels."9  Finally, ninety-six percent of Giffen Elementary's
students were recipients under the federal free-lunch program.198
By September 1997, twenty percent of the student body, had
used the scholarships to attend a private school.'99 The number
includes the child of the President of Giffen's Parent Teacher
Association.' 0 One commentator noted that "It]his exodus sent
a much-needed wake-up call to Albany public school officials who
immediately took steps to reform Giffen Elementary.2 1  The
Albany Superintendent of Schools transferred Giffen's principal
and replaced her with a new principal and two assistant principals,
one of whom was specifically assigned to oversee and improve
academic performance.2 2 The Superintendent then interviewed
each of the school's teachers and found cause to fire twenty percent
of them.20 3 To help foster academic improvements, the Albany
Urban League provided a $100,000 grant to help Giffen students
advance in reading.2" As the head of the Albany Branch of the
NAACP said, "[The ABCS program] has made [the school
bureaucrats] take a look at what was happening, or not happening,
at Giffen, and take actions they may not otherwise have tak-
en.205
As this statement implies, public schools benefit from private
school voucher programs and school choice. When public schools
are faced with the possibility of large student transfers, and a
corresponding loss of funding, the public schools have shown a
willingness to make improvements both in how and what they
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teach. Evidently, competition with the private schools is good for
learning within the public schools. The changes that school
competition effectuates will benefit the students who stay at the
public school and will cause the public school to evaluate its
methods of educating these children. Caroline Hoxby, an assistant
professor of economics at Harvard University, studied the effective-
ness of school choice programs. Professor Hoxby concluded that
public schools react to competition by offering better schooling and
reducing costs. She also found that increased competition results
in significant improvements in student test scores, educational
attainments, and wages.2"
Another argument made by school choice opponents is that
allowing students to leave the public schools in favor of private or
religious institutions will leave the poorest students in the public
schools. This argument, however, does not appear to have much
merit. This is because school choice programs, including the
Pennsylvania school choice legislation, have income eligibility caps.
Indeed, the only students who may participate in the program at its
inception are the poorest students in the school system. In the
Pennsylvania school choice legislation, for example, financial
support would be restricted to families earning $15,000 or less.2 7
In addition, the recently established school choice programs in
Cleveland and Milwaukee target at-risk children, exclusively from
low-income families.20 8
Rich students already have the ability to choose private or
religious schools, and social justice should compel legislatures to
allow poor children to have the same choice that their more
affluent peers enjoy. As Rev. Floyd H. Flake, a former Democratic
Congressman from New York, insists, "America has been commit-
ted to equal opportunity in education ever since the historic Brown
v. Board of Education decision of 1954. But our country will never
be able to achieve this commitment until we open up choice and
competition in our inner-city school."2"
A third argument made by opponents of school choice is that
the money to be used in school voucher programs would be better
spent on all students in the public schools. This belief, however
206. The Center for Education Reform, supra note 189 (citing Professor Hoxby's studies).
207. See Pennsylvania School Choice Legislation § 1304-B(b)(2) (1998).
208. See The Center for Education Reform, supra note 189.




good its intentions, is dead-wrong. "In 1990 the United States
spent an average of $5,247 per student, two and a half times what
we spent in 1960 and more than is spent by any other industrial
democracy. Yet SAT scores have dropped nearly 80 points in the
past three decades., 211 In addition, an independent analysis of
how much money spent on education in cities like Washington,
D.C., New York City, and Chicago will show that school districts
that spend the most often have the worst scores. 211 These figures
should sound the death knell for the argument that more money
would solve the current inadequacies of our educational system.
Moreover, United States Representative Todd Tiahrt noted that
when parents express their unhappiness about the quality of
schools where they live, it is very rare that they point to
insufficient money as a source of their unhappiness. In fact, it
is almost never a question of money. They are much more
likely to point out no respect for authority and the lack of
discipline in the classroom, their fear of violence in schools, or
their disagreement with the values and attitudes taught their
children.212
As Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge advises, "if our students are
to excel in the 21st century-if that is truly our goal-then more
money alone will not be enough. We will need to be more vigilant
in our pursuit of excellence -wherever we find it.
213
As this section makes clear, the arguments against school
choice can easily be refuted. School choice will not have an
adverse effect on public schools; in fact, it appears as though it will
have a positive effects on public schools. Further, school choice
will not leave the poorest children behind in the public schools;
school choice programs are designed to target low-income families.
Finally, more money into the dying system will not help it. As
former President Richard Nixon counsels, "[w]e should stop doing
what demonstrably fails and do instead what demonstrably
succeeds.,
214
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VI. Conclusion
One cannot ignore the role that religious organizations play in
delivering critical services and programs paid for by government.
To hold that all of these programs, including the proposed
Pennsylvania school choice legislation, should now be deemed
unconstitutional would contradict the precedent established by the
Supreme Court on this issue. If the expenditure of governmental
funds is prohibited whenever a parent chooses to use the funds for
sectarian purposes and pursuant to a religious-neutral program,
then the United States Supreme Court would have to overrule
many of its prior decisions.215 The bottom line is this: the Penn-
sylvania school choice legislation is good law, it is good policy, and
the Pennsylvania General Assembly should make up for its
dereliction of duty by enacting school choice as soon as possi-
ble -before another child is left behind.
Brad P Bender
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